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Understanding Social Performance: A ‘Practice Drift’ at
the Frontline of Microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh
Mathilde Maıˆtrot
ABSTRACT
This article examines the role of microfinance staff and procedures in en-
abling microfinance’s social mission. It does so primarily through studying
institutional ruling relations and practices in rural Bangladesh. Attempting
to move away from the linear and deterministic approaches of impact stud-
ies, it ethnographically scrutinizes the everyday practices of implementers.
Findings point to the emergence of systemic practices that jeopardize micro-
finance institutions’ potential to perform their social mission. These include
low client-selection standards, hard selling of loans and forceful loan renewal,
little follow-up on loan use, and abusive and violent client-retention and
repayment-collection strategies. This is conceptualized as a ‘practice drift’
as distinct from the commonly reported ‘mission drift’. Rather than stem-
ming from planned, top-down changes in institutional mission and strategy,
practice drift emerges from a displacement of decision-making processes to
the branches. The article argues that observed changes in microfinance prac-
tice are enabled by decentralized structures and management systems that
leave the choice of tactics used to achieve targets to the discretion of field
staff.
INTRODUCTION
Determining the performance of development policy requires vast amounts
of energy and resources from planners and researchers (Easterly, 2006).
Policy makers often relegate implementers’ roles to enacting and applying
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prescribed administrative tasks (Biggs and Smith, 2003). This discur-
sive determinism can exaggerate the role of structures in enacting
change (Long and Long, 1992) in that it neglects the crucial part played
by human actions and agency in determining the success or failure of pol-
icy initiatives (Juma and Clarke, 1995: 126). Similar assumptions about
the linear and predictable relationship between policy and practice inform
most existing analyses of microfinance interventions. This article explores
this phenomenon in relation to social performance, and proposes alternative
ways of conceptualizing the relationship between microfinance’s mission
and its impacts, which help account for the mixed results and diverging
experiences associated with microfinance.
The microfinance sector emerged in the 1990s as a revolutionary tool for
poverty alleviation (Morduch, 1998; Robinson, 2002). It is implemented
through structures called microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs are consid-
ered institutional ‘hybrids’ (Labie, 2001: 297), mandated to achieve a dou-
ble bottom line of financial self-sufficiency and poverty reduction through
reconciling market forces with development objectives (Armenda´riz and
Morduch, 2005). They deliver financial products and services to the bottom
of the pyramid, those labelled by mainstream banks as unreliable borrowers
incapable of saving (Cull et al., 2009). A tenet of microfinance is that the
provision of financial services and products can enable poor households to
invest productively in activities that generate sufficient financial returns to
improve their condition and free themselves from poverty (Yunus and Jolis,
1999).
Since the early 1990s, the sector has undergone significant structural
transformations characterized by increasing commercialization (Otero and
Rhyne, 1994; Robinson, 2002). In practice, many MFIs have implemented
new, ‘more comprehensive management procedures’ (Beisland et al., 2014:
277) to bring efficiency and sustainability to their activities through relent-
less cost-cutting strategies. First and foremost these procedures aimed to
protect MFIs’ financial performance (Christen and Drake, 2002: Ch. 1;
Woller, 2002b). This was seen as all the more crucial in this case be-
cause the poor clients were considered to be the principal source of
risk. Major stakeholders, academics and development agencies often en-
couraged the development of frameworks and tools to improve MFIs’
ability to cover their costs (Godquin, 2004; Littlefield and Rosenberg,
2004).
While many MFIs have successfully established financial sustainability,
questions concerning their impact have been raised and remain unanswered
(Hermes and Lensink, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Roy, 2010). The
emergence of ‘crises’ and ‘scandals’ from different countries across the
world over the past 10 years has polarized opinions about microfinance’s
impact. On the one hand, a number of quantitative studies provide evidence
of microfinance’s positive impacts on some dimensions, including income,
well-being and consumption expenses in Kenya (Erulkar and Chong, 2005),
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Ethiopia (Haftom, 2013; Tesfay and Gardebroek, 2010), Egypt (Abou-Ali
et al., 2010), India (Imai et al., 2010), Sri Lanka (De Silva, 2012; Thibbo-
tuwawa et al., 2012), Pakistan (Ghalib et al., 2011) and Bangladesh (Islam,
2011; Islam and Maitra, 2012; Khandker and Samad, 2013).
On the other hand, reviews of quantitative empirical data on micro-
finance’s impact on poverty find a disjuncture between official narratives
of best practice from the sector and the lack of conclusive evidence sup-
porting these claims (Duvendack et al., 2011; Maıˆtrot and Nin˜o-Zarazu´a,
2015; Roodman, 2011; Stewart et al., 2012). A large body of work ar-
gues that microfinance interventions have insignificant effects on poverty
(Cre´pon et al., 2015; Nin˜o-Zarazu´a, 2007; Swain and Floro, 2012; Tarozzi
et al., 2015) and indeed negatively affect the poorest (Bateman, 2012; Dat-
tasharma et al., 2016; Roodman and Morduch, 2014; Setboonsarng and
Parpiev, 2008; Taylor, 2012; Waelde, 2011), particularly women (Fernando,
2006; Kabeer, 2005; Karim, 2011). Numerous studies argue that micro-
finance leads to over-indebtedness (Gue´rin et al., 2013; Schicks, 2013),
often prompting households to migrate to escape their debt obligation and
even, some have found, driving people to suicide (Kinetz, 2012; Kumar,
2012). A set of six randomized control trials, each conducted in a differ-
ent country, reported insignificant effects on important ‘families of out-
comes’, such as income, consumption and social indicators (Banerjee et al.,
2015: 36).
A primary explanation for the limited effectiveness of MFIs in reducing
poverty has been the commercial and profit-oriented nature of many of them
(Ghosh, 2013). Studies by Arunachalam (2011), Taylor (2012) and Gue´rin
et al. (2013) closely examine the gradual commercialization of institutions
in Andhra Pradesh, South India, Kenya and Mexico, providing rich country-
specific analyses of the emerging internal tensions and paradoxes within
MFIs between their financial and social missions. These in some ways mirror
those seen in the Western financial sector’s ‘subprime crisis’ (Mader, 2015),
questioning banking institutions’ capacity to uphold ethical lending practices
(Hulme and Maıˆtrot, 2014).
Many scholars have explained these dynamics in terms of a ‘mission
drift’ (Copestake, 2007: 1722; Woller, 2002b: 14), whereby senior man-
agers, faced with the challenge of microfinance’s double bottom line, are
said to take deliberate measures to resolve the perceived trade-off between
the financial and social missions, at the expense of the latter. According
to this argument, the increasing commercialization of the sector incen-
tivizes managers to alter their institutional strategy to better align it with
commercially-minded stakeholders’ interests. MFIs therefore purposefully
target wealthier households, not to cross-subsidize for poorer ones but to
secure high financial returns (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011). The mis-
sion drift therefore denotes an intentional and explicit top-down shift in
the institutional practices of MFIs towards securing and protecting financial
performance or profits (Fouillet and Augsburg, 2010).
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This article contributes to understanding social performance in micro-
finance. It will argue that existing studies of social performance have rein-
forced a deterministic understanding of microfinance, which assumes that
policy translates linearly into practice. The role of implementers, and im-
plementation processes and mechanisms, remain largely under-studied and
under-conceptualized in attempts to understand performance and impact.
This article deepens our understanding of how microfinance works, as op-
posed to whether it works, by examining the role of implementers and
implementation. It builds on a central insight of the mission-drift concept,
which is that commercialization has changed the way microfinance is prac-
tised. The argument developed here, however, is that in the MFIs studied,
senior managers have not explicitly shifted away from their stated social
mission, nor have they explicitly targeted better-off households. Malprac-
tices observed stem not from a shift in mission translating linearly down
into the field, but from a tacit displacement of the decision-making pro-
cess about social–financial trade-offs to the branch level, fuelled by the
need to achieve everyday targets. These targets are often assumed to be
an effective way to institutionalize and administer the pursuit of the so-
cial mission (increasing the number of clients and monitoring outstanding
loan amounts). In fact, as we shall see, they serve the financial perfor-
mance of branches while warping management practice and the interests
and behaviours of staff. The predatory and fraudulent strategies and tac-
tics developed by field-level staff to achieve the targets affect the social
performance of the MFI in ways that contradict its stated social mission.
This is conceptualized here as a ‘practice drift’. These informal yet in-
stitutionalized practices shape client recruitment and follow-up, loan re-
newals, top-up loans and repayment collection procedures. In recognizing
the diverse meanings of microfinance for different actors and the variety
of practices microfinance embodies, this study nuances the literature which
presents microfinance as a uniform and homogeneous development inter-
vention (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011; Labie et al., 2009; Rhyne and
Otero, 2007). It also suggests an alternative route for explaining its un-
foreseen and unintended practices and impact on clients (Brigg, 2006;
Campbell, 2010; Cons and Paprocki, 2010; Gue´rin et al., 2013; Karim,
2008).
This article examines the social performance of microfinance in the con-
text of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is often seen as the birthplace of micro-
finance, which makes it a particularly pertinent context to study the perfor-
mance and implementation strategies of MFIs. The spread of microfinance
in Bangladesh from the 1980s until 2005 was unprecedented and far greater
than in any other country. Bangladesh has since become the second largest
microfinance market in the world (after India) with 22 million active borrow-
ers in 2016. By 2013, 60 per cent of households in rural Bangladesh reported
having taken microcredit at some stage, with credit-based group loans re-
paid weekly dominating the market (Osmani, 2016). Bangladeshi MFIs
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including ASA, BRAC, BURO Bangladesh1 and Grameen Bank2 account
for 46 per cent of the total number of credit officers and 47 per cent of the to-
tal number of MFI offices in the whole of South Asia (Khamar, 2016). With
a large body of scholarship focusing on measuring outreach and impact in
Bangladesh, fundamental questions about the institutional performance and
implementation mechanisms of these ‘institutional hybrids’ remain largely
overlooked.
Following this introduction, the first section of the article critically ex-
amines the conceptualization of social performance within microfinance, ar-
guing that insufficient attention is given to the implementers and processes
of implementation. The next section demonstrates the value of using ex-
isting scholarship on organizational theory, institutions and implementation
to better understand everyday practices in microfinance (de Certeau et al.,
1980; Lipsky, 1980; Mosse, 2005; Smith, 1987). The third section presents
the methodology, fieldwork site and original data used and introduces the
case study of ASA, renowned for being one of the most cost-efficient MFIs
in the world. The subsequent sections constitute the empirical body of the
article. They introduce the concept of practice drift; analyse the context
within which ASA built its financial discipline; explore the ruling relations
that organize everyday relationships; and show the significance for perfor-
mance of the discretionary power of credit officers and branch managers.
The conclusion summarizes the article’s main contributions and reflects on
their wider significance for the microfinance industry.
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE IN MICROFINANCE PRACTICE
Policies for international development at the end of the 20th century were
characterized by a free-market ideology. The Washington Consensus, in
particular, played a central role in embedding international development
policies in neoliberal frameworks of privatization, liberalization and dereg-
ulation alongside a rolling back of the state (Kamat, 2004). Designing pro-
poor market-based innovations became a rallying call for the private sector
to sell products and services to the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (Karnani, 2007:
94; Prahalad, 2005). In this context, microfinance, or more accurately mi-
crocredit, was considered a revolutionary tool (Morduch, 1998, 1999; Otero
and Rhyne, 1994). As a result, until the mid-1990s, to meet donors’ and
stakeholders’ interests, much of the literature and research on microfinance
focused on supporting MFIs to become financially viable (Hulme and Moore,
2007; Woller and Woodworth, 2001).
1. The acronyms stand for Association for Social Advancement, Building Resources across
Communities, and Basic Unit for Resources and Opportunities, respectively.
2. While the first three are registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Grameen is
registered as a bank.
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By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, multiple studies were warning
of the risk that MFIs’ mission could shift towards prioritizing profits over
poverty-reduction objectives (Woller, 2002a, 2002b). Although financial
performance is generally well embedded within MFIs, as it enables them to
demonstrate their ability to mitigate the financial risks associated with serv-
ing the poor, the same is not always true for social performance (Copestake,
2004). The latter is more ambiguous and dependent on the good intentions
of senior management; in other words, it is self-regulated (Copestake, 2004,
2007; Hashemi, 2007). Because it was often assumed that providing loans
to the poor would in itself systematically generate positive outcomes, the
perceived need for having tighter social-performance management and mon-
itoring within MFIs was relatively weak.
A dominant explanation for low social-performance achievements of
MFIs, as mentioned in the introduction, was that faced with trade-offs
between the financial and social mission, MFIs favoured financial perfor-
mance — the so-called ‘mission drift’. Some scholars feared that this drift
would weaken the rationale for MFIs to serve the poor (Cull et al., 2007).
The opportunity cost of providing products and delivering services to poorer
customers would be outweighed by the potential benefits associated with
serving better-off households, thereby affecting MFIs’ depth of outreach
(Schreiner, 2002). Researchers, practitioners, investors and donors use large
average loan size as a proxy for mission drift (Armenda´riz and Szafarz,
2011; Aubert et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2007; Fouillet and Augsburg, 2010;
Frank et al., 2008). A large average loan size, in theory, indicates that an
MFI’s social mission has drifted because it means the institution has moved
away from serving the vulnerable poor in order to mitigate the risks and costs
associated with serving this particular segment (Mersland and Strøm, 2010:
29). Outreach to the poor is therefore central to the mission-drift definition
and argument.
The proliferation of social-performance initiatives in the early 2000s re-
flected both rising doubts regarding MFIs’ potential to reduce poverty (Mal-
hotra et al., 2002; Zeller et al., 2003) and increasing pressures from investors
and funding agencies to establish sound evidence of impact (Cochran, 2007:
451). Under the umbrella of the Social Performance Task Force (SPTF),3 a
number of organizations have, to a substantial degree, reached a consensus
on their approach to social performance (Sinha, 2006), defining it as ‘the
effective translation of an institution’s social goals into practice in line with
3. SPTF is a membership-based body that aims to advance understandings and practices
related to social performance within MFIs. Member organizations include the Imp-Act
consortium; Comite´ d’Echange, de Re´flexion et d’Information sur les Syste`mes d’Epargne-
cre´dit (CERISE) — which roughly translates as the Committee for Exchange, Reflection
and Information on Credit Unions; the Small Enterprise Education and Promotion Network
(SEEP); the Argidius Foundation; Foro Latinoamericano y del Caribe (FORO-LAC) — the
Latin American and Caribbean Forum; and the Grameen Foundation.
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Figure 1. The Social Performance Framework
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Source: Hashemi (2007).
accepted social values’ (Hashemi, 2007: 3; IFAD, 2006; Woller and Brau,
2004). The aim of the SPTF and other such initiatives is to improve MFIs’
responsiveness to clients’ needs and increase their accountability to multiple
stakeholders in the sector (Doligez and Lapenu, 2006).
To date, approaches to social performance have, however, been conceptu-
ally and practically limited for three main reasons. First, they offer a narrow
and deterministic framework for understanding the diverse means through
which MFIs interact with clients. Their cause–effect approach conceptual-
izes social performance as a linear process that originates in MFIs’ mission
and is directly translated through internal systems and activities into out-
puts, outcomes and impact (Jacquand, 2005). This linear structure–conduct–
performance paradigm (Figure 1) was adapted from industrial organizations
and applied to MFIs (Zeller et al., 2003). This perspective potentially ignores
the significance of processes of implementation and roles of implementers
in determining outcomes and impact. Second, a major pitfall for social per-
formance is that the standards set by such initiatives are very often not
institutionalized within MFIs. Furthermore, when they are, they often rely
on MFIs’ self-assessment processes whereby managers self-administer ques-
tionnaires evaluating their own social performance at their own discretion.
This assumes that they have access to reliable information and, importantly,
that sufficient incentives are in place for staff members to report accurately on
their performance. Third, developing universal monitoring tools and targets
to prove and quantify social performance (number of poor clients, savings
and outstanding loan amounts) can distort the way microfinance is practised
and obscure understandings of context-specific processes of impact (Zeller
et al., 2003).
By their nature, monitoring data provide little analytical insight into
how microfinance’s social mission is implemented or if it is indeed im-
plementable. Social-performance monitoring approaches and tools gener-
ally are not designed to understand processes of impact but to measure it.
Their purpose was to hold institutions accountable to donors and the wider
public with regard to their financial and social mission. So far the body of
evidence on microfinance’s impact is mixed, with outcomes varying from
one context to another, one institution to another and one study to another.
This begs the question: what determines the institutional performance of
MFIs?
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THE STUDY OF IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPLEMENTERS
This section looks at the relevance of important strands of literature on
institutional and organizational theory to advancing the analysis of institu-
tional performance within microfinance. The work of Lipsky (1980) and de
Certeau et al. (1980) recognized the importance of studying processes of
implementation and problematizing the roles of implementers within insti-
tutions. When we apply this to the study of microfinance and its institutions,
we do so through a lens that considers the relational positioning and political
economy of implementers and their influence on the implementation process
and, therefore, on outcomes. As argued in the previous section, this under-
standing is lacking in existing frameworks for understanding microfinance’s
social performance and impact.
Policies mobilize institutions that organize and govern practices. At the
same time, policies are implemented through multiple channels, which
fragment the policies into activities across different institutional actors,
thereby potentially distorting the purpose of these policies (Shore and
Wright, 1997). Smith (1987: 161–65) points to the difficulties of studying
institutions as unitary organizations, arguing that it is people’s everyday
actions and patterns of ‘ruling relations’ stemming from structures that
determine the outcomes of policies. Ruling relations — defined as an
‘internally coordinated complex of administrative, managerial, professional
and discursive organization that regulates, organizes, governs and other-
wise controls our societies’ (Smith, 1999: 49–50) — shape institutional
practice in the field. These forms of power relations are often diffuse, per-
vasive and discursive. They are also mediated, through institutional texts,
administrative procedures and policies and, crucially, through social rela-
tions. Smith’s approach to institutional ethnography identifies institutional
actors according to the meaning they give to policies and everyday hap-
penings within an organizational structure. Ruling relations, when mapped
locally, provide a framework for understanding wider translocal and sys-
temic power relations within institutional bureaucracies (Smith, 1997: 38–
39). The study of ruling relations and interactions can help unearth the
systemic dimension of diffuse, personal, implicit or informal institutional
practices (De´pelteau, 2008; Smith, 1987). Work on organizational theory
by Jepperson (1991) offers analytical insights into what activities and
relations form institutions and what institutions reproduce patterns of
relations:
An institution represents a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property;
institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment. By order or pattern, I refer, as is
conventional, to standardized interaction sequences. An institution is then a social pattern that
reveals a particular reproduction process. . . . [I]nstitutions are not reproduced by ‘action’ in
this strict sense of collective intervention in a social convention. Rather, routine reproductive
procedures support and sustain the pattern, furthering its reproduction. (Jepperson, 1991:
145)
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As this quote indicates, the outcomes of policies must be understood as also
determined by the routine reproduction of implementers’ patterns of proce-
dures and relations. The work of Lipsky (1980) demonstrates the significance
of these dynamics through an examination of the role that street-level bu-
reaucrats play in shaping institutional practices and policy outcomes. Lipsky
argues that the power of discretion of street-level bureaucrats allows staff to
absorb the misalignment between standardized public policies and local real-
ity by remaking policy at street level. His argument, like that of Smith (1987),
challenges the conceptualization of policy as a predictable, apolitical and lin-
ear framework implemented by institutional blueprints rather than humans
subjects. Anonymous human subjects, ‘common heroes’, employ everyday
tactical practices and ordinary relations to subvert and ‘fool’ the dominating
power and order (de Certeau et al., 1980: 3–4). This framework emphasizes
the need to better scrutinize the significance of the patterns of practices,
behaviours and ‘ruling relations’ to understand institutions, implementers
and processes of implementation that can be applied to microfinance.
The argument made here to scrutinize more closely the role of imple-
menters resonates with previous studies within international development.
Implementation paradigms have been examined in detail by Mosse (2005).
Development policies, he argues, are shaped by the exigencies of organiza-
tions as they shape the system of everyday rules and codes, goals and inter-
ests that organize implementation. Studying the ‘everyday’ points to pres-
sures and incentives that condition and motivate staff members. Similarly to
scholarship on street-level bureaucracies, the study of the everyday enables
problematizing the position of implementers in linear and top-down imple-
mentation blueprints. In terms of understanding performance, it opens up
the possibility for a bottom-up exploration of delivery mechanisms through
studying key human actors.
In the field of microfinance, studies conducted in Asia and Africa have shed
an empirical light on MFI loan officers, recognizing the multi-dimensional
nature of fieldworkers’ functions (Ahmad, 2002a, 2002b; Goetz, 2001). Such
work draws attention to studying the ‘faces’ of the MFI officers who are
responsible for delivering and managing ‘the social good’ (Siwale, 2013:
2), and who come lowest in the MFI organizational hierarchy. Aligned
with these arguments, Dixon et al. (2007) have demonstrated how loan
officers’ behaviour substantially and sometimes unexpectedly influences
the outcome and impact of many credit programmes. The above analysis,
I believe, constitutes a strong rationale for the focus and methodological
approach outlined in the following section.
THE FIELDWORK
The analytical approach adopted in this article focuses on the study of insti-
tutions through the lens of implementers, in line with the studies by Mosse
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(2005), Lipsky (1980) and Smith (1987), who explored the complexity of
examining everyday institutional practices and relations between policy, in-
stitutions and employees. The research on which this article is based used
an abductive research strategy combining a deductive and an inductive ap-
proach (Dubois and Gadde, 2002: 559). The logic of this approach is to
use an exploratory research methodology from which theorization and fur-
ther exploration and focused observations are used iteratively. Using mixed
methods, I studied the perceptions and experiences of microfinance of di-
verse groups of people in rural villages and at an institutional level over
a period of 12 months between 2010 and 2011. Given the sensitivity of
the information collected, data triangulation through different sources of
information and means of data collection was essential.
The research was conducted in Tangail district, the same district in
Bangladesh in which, in 1979, Mohammed Yunus first piloted what four
years later became the Grameen Model. It is generally recognized that Tan-
gail is one of the districts that is most densely served by MFIs (Armenda´riz
and Morduch, 2005: 128). All the major indigenous Bangladeshi micro-
finance organizations have branches in Tangail and in the Upazila4 where
this research was conducted. This Upazila does not flood frequently; it has
extensive irrigation facilities and extensive cultivation of high-yielding vari-
eties of rice and other crops. Seasonality, however, affects rural livelihoods
in Tangail, as in most districts in Bangladesh. Thus, the research site selected
captures the impacts on livelihoods of seasonal flooding, which affects most
of the country, while avoiding over-representing livelihoods that are ex-
tremely vulnerable to environmental hazards (flash floods and river erosion
for example). This enables investigation and comparison of ways in which
MFIs perform in an area that is reasonably typical of rural settings in much of
Bangladesh. The data presented must therefore be interpreted and understood
in the context of competitive rural markets in which MFIs including ASA,
BRAC, Buro, Grameen Bank, and many smaller local NGO-MFIs operate.
The research was divided into two stages. In the first stage, a survey was ad-
ministered to 490 rural households, covering four villages in a district where
the density of MFIs is particularly high, to determine levels of poverty, life
trajectories and microfinance membership. Through analysing these data,
three categories of household were delineated based on their livelihood sta-
tus: improving, stable and declining. Six focus group discussions were then
conducted with each category of household, aimed at identifying whether
the institutional practices of MFIs could partially explain clients’ livelihood
status. The purpose was to identify common patterns of experiences. Fur-
thermore, in-depth interviews with nine former clients of MFIs aimed at
exploring whether quitting microfinance could be associated with an indi-
cator for improvement in clients’ livelihood. During this period, extensive
4. An Upazila is an administrative sub-district.
‘Practice Drift’ in Microfinance Institutions in Bangladesh 11
participant observation was conducted in each of the research sites, within
communities and institutions alike. Moreover, non-clients of microfinance
and authoritative figures within the local community (police officers, village
leaders, imams and union chairmen) were also interviewed about micro-
finance and MFIs’ practices. On the basis of this, two MFIs were identified
as the best- and worst-performing, as judged by the clients themselves.
The second phase of the research consisted of institutional ethnographies
of the two selected MFIs. The purpose of this was to understand whether
the perceptions and experiences of clients and former clients related to the
institutional structures of these MFIs. During this period, extensive partic-
ipant observation and informal interviews were conducted with field-level
staff. More formally, access to field-staff members who interact directly
with clients was informally negotiated with four branch managers who were
themselves subsequently interviewed. A self-administered questionnaire,
which included closed and open-ended questions on their experiences of
delivering microfinance to clients and their personal relationships with their
employing institutions, was completed by 36 credit officers. Thereafter, 12
semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals higher up in
the institutional hierarchy, including regional and district managers based in
rural and semi-rural settings and senior managers located at the institutions’
headquarters. This article uses the data from ASA, one of the two institu-
tional case studies, to explore the implications of institutional practices for
the relationship between credit officers and clients. ASA was selected as a
case study based on consistent negative accounts from the community re-
garding ASA’s institutional practices. The impact of the identified practices
on clients will be the focus of a future article.
These interviews and surveys sought to understand the social positioning,
power relations and inner politics within the institution. To do this, data
from non-clients were collected before data on clients, data on clients before
loan officers, and data on loan officers before managers and senior staff
members. This was important to maintain independence from the perceived
hierarchical relations and to establish a rapport of trust with participants. By
shifting from a traditional top-down process of data collection, this reorgan-
ization was particularly valuable to investigating how power relations were
constructed and reproduced by actors and subjects of microfinance. Further
methodological details can be found in Maıˆtrot (2014). All interviews were
audio-recorded and transcribed from Bengali to English. Names of individ-
uals and the exact location of Upazilas and villages have been anonymized
to protect respondents’ identities.
UNDERSTANDING PRACTICE DRIFT
The case study of ASA, one of the most cost-efficient MFIs in the world,
focuses on social performance by analysing the processes of implementation
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and the everyday roles and relations of implementers from a perspective that
sees policy as translating into sets of practices in a non-linear fashion. The
empirical findings presented below demonstrate that a set of informal prac-
tices has been developed and reproduced by field-level staff and has become
institutionalized within ASA. These practices determine ruling relations at
the field level by enabling staff practices to drift in a way that undermines
the institution’s social performance. This is enabled by a heavily decentral-
ized structure of governance and management, serving a low-cost expansion
strategy.
The dynamics described in the following sections are conceptualized here
as a ‘practice drift’. This both builds on the concept of ‘mission drift’ and
points to its limitations, by problematizing how microfinance is practised
at the field level and by better explaining its mixed results. The concept
of a practice drift shares a central claim of the mission-drift argument:
that there is a relationship between the commercialization of microfinance,
the way in which microfinance is practised and outcomes for clients. It
differs, however, in four important respects. First, mission drift refers to an
intentional, top-down change in MFIs’ strategy (to respond to commercial
pressures), whereas practice drift argues that without any alteration in claims
about the mission of microfinance, practices in the field can shift in a way
that contradicts its social mission. The dynamics observed at the field level
appear to be disjointed from the social mission of microfinance, which has
remained unchanged, despite commercialization.
Second, a key characteristic of mission drift is the argument that MFIs
move away from poorer clients in favour of less risky clients and larger
loans to better-off households (Copestake, 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010).
Practice drift places emphasis on a set of informal practices through which
MFI field staff achieve financial targets. This includes the opportunistic
targeting and retaining of poor and vulnerable households. MFIs’ depth of
outreach therefore seemingly remains aligned with the social mission of
microfinance: serving the poor.
Third, the notion of practice drift points to loan officers and managers
using their discretionary power to achieve targets. This often entails a drift
in the behaviour and attitudes of field-level staff subjected to everyday
targets and the need to maintain good relationships with colleagues and
superiors. Loan officers’ practical and immediate interests lie in limiting
time-consuming procedures and in disciplining clients. Spending time with
clients (assessing their creditworthiness, repayment capacity and investment
purposes) is therefore devalued and discouraged as it represents a high
opportunity cost for managers and credit officers who are not rewarded for
it. They are encouraged to be inflexible about repayments and to put financial
targets before social achievement, which they do through sometimes violent
and abusive means.
Fourth, the notion of mission drift does not capture the opportunities for
implementers to move away from formal practices regulated by MFIs and
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underestimates the significant role played by implementers in outcomes.
The practice-drift argument highlights that it is at the margins that the trade-
offs between the social and financial missions of microfinance are being
brokered by fieldworkers (Siwale, 2013; van den Berg et al., 2015). In
highly decentralized structures this can remain unnoticed or ignored by
senior managers.
In summary, then, while the practice-drift and mission-drift arguments
both recognize the impacts of commercialization practices on microfinance’s
outcomes and impacts, practice drift demonstrates how field-level structures
and management systems create the conditions for practices to drift, and
social performance to suffer, without there having been a deliberate, top-
down shift in the mission of the MFI. The mission-drift argument describes
a top-down decision-making process, in which changes in mission lead to
a change in field practices. The practice-drift argument points to a potential
displacement of that decision making down to the branch level. The case
study of ASA will demonstrate that the pursuit of low-cost, streamlined
delivery creates conditions within which the pursuit of social performance
is actively discouraged or even punished at branch level. Under such condi-
tions, to ‘perform well’ within ASA means to meet specific targets that are
assumed by senior managers to reflect social performance but which in fact
serve the financial performance of the branch. Evidence from the case of
ASA highlights this contradiction between these targets’ intended purpose
and what they achieve in practice.
ASA’S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: A SKILFUL BUREAUCRACY
This section analyses the means through which ASA built its good finan-
cial performance. By doing so it demonstrates how rigid financial targets
and incentive structures coupled with continuous and pervasive low-cost
monitoring systems can effectively serve financial performance. This sec-
tion contextualizes the evolution of ASA within Bangladesh’s political and
development history.
In the late 1980s, international aid donor agencies and foreign governments
became increasingly pro-market, opposing the Bangladeshi government’s
socialist political-economic thinking (Rutherford, 2009: 37–52). During this
period, Bangladeshi NGOs emerged as a solution to the perceived decline
in the efficacy of the government in reducing poverty (Lewis, 2004; Sham-
suddoha, 2003; White, 1999). With direct support to NGOs rising from 6
per cent of total aid disbursed to Bangladesh to 18 per cent between 1990
and 1995 (Devine, 2003: 229), NGOs became crucial implementers of state
services to citizens through dense rural and urban networks (Zaman, 2004).
Wood (1996) characterized this phenomenon as the ‘franchise of the state’.
As a consequence of the growing degree of competition among domes-
tic non-state actors (Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011), many NGOs sought to
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build financial self-sufficiency (Fernando, 2006) in an attempt to maintain
a degree of autonomy from the political patronage of donor agencies and
governments (Lewis, 2017). This domestic political economy provided an
auspicious terrain for NGOs to use microfinance as a strategy to expand their
outreach (Wood, 1996; Wood and Sharif, 1997). By targeting poor women,
microfinance was also able to appropriate and capitalize on the women-in-
development paradigm advocated and supported by multilateral donors and
Western development agencies (Karim, 2008, 2011).
ASA emerged in 1978 pursuing a radical social-mobilization agenda, but
this collective-action agenda provided limited results. In line with the wider
dynamics of ‘development as delivery’ (Rutherford, 1995: 70) in the devel-
opment sector in Bangladesh, ASA shifted to microcredit and became one of
the country’s most skilful administrators of financial services and products
to the poor (Zaman, 2004). Its rapid and cost-effective scaling-up capacity,
and its administration of simple and standardized operational procedures on
a massive scale with a ‘vision unmatched in its clarity and relentlessness’
(Morduch in Rutherford, 2009: ix), gained international recognition.
ASA’s institutional model and strategy of expansion evolved over the
years to adjust to the levels of borrowers’ delinquency, especially from
2008. Structurally, ASA is decentralized and has adopted standardized and
low-cost human resources policies to maintain high financial performance
(MacDonald, 2012). It was this model that saw ASA named as the world’s
leading MFI by the Microfinance Information Exchange’s MIX Market re-
port in 2005,5 and the world’s best MFI by Forbes in 2007 (out of 641 micro-
finance service providers worldwide) and led to its winning The Financial
Times and International Finance Corporation’s ‘Banking at the Bottom of
the Pyramid 2008’ (out of 129 institutions across 54 countries) (ASA, 2012).
Not only has ASA grown in Bangladesh, its model, seen as an exemplar of
efficiency, has been replicated by other MFIs in India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Philippines, Uganda, Tanzania, Myanmar, Kenya and Ghana.
This NGO achieves impressive financial efficiency. In Bangladesh it mul-
tiplied the number of active borrowers more than 3.5 times within less than a
decade (from 2001 and 2008) and the size of its portfolio more than 200 times
in 20 years — from US$ 2.97 million in 1992 to more than US$ 608.08 mil-
lion in 2012 (MIX Market, 2013). In 2011, ASA’s financial self-sufficiency
reached 118.32 per cent and operational self-sufficiency 182.48 per cent
while its operating cost ratio has been halved (from 21.89 per cent in 1992 to
9.82 per cent in 2012) (ibid.). The NGO declared itself donor-free in 2011.
It envisaged disbursing US$ 2.5 billion in loans among 6.6 million clients
over 2015–16 in Bangladesh only (ASA, 2015), and overachieved this target
5. A non-profit based in Washington, DC, the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) pro-
vides market data and intelligence on financial service providers catering to the poor. Their
MIX Market platform consolidates organizational data on financial and social performance
in the microfinance industry.
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by actually disbursing US$ 2.68 billion to 7.4 million clients (ASA, 2016).
Although ASA has developed a large set of products and services (savings,
credits and life insurance among others), 96 per cent of its product portfolio
depends on one credit-based product — the ‘primary loan’ at 15 per cent flat
interest rate (29 per cent annual percentage rate), aligned with the ceiling
set on MFIs in 2009 by the Microfinance Regulation Authorities (MRA)6
(ASA, 2010; MIX Market, 2013). The rates used by MFIs are expected to
be higher than those of commercial banks due to the size of loans and the
high transaction costs.
ASA follows a growth-focused strategy and uses target-based financial
monitoring systems spread across all levels, from branches to regional and
district offices. According to interviews with regional and district managers,
it is regional managers who balance surpluses and deficits across the region.
They do so by moving financial resources from one branch to another in a
way that ensures sufficient liquidity for branches to function properly and
respond to demand. Minimal costs are borne by the headquarters of ASA as
the branches assume the human resource and administrative costs of their
staff members. Branches function as financially self-sufficient profit centres
that follow rules standardized across the MFI. Regional managers allocate
funds across branches (between four and six) by assessing the reports on pro-
jected loans and savings and anticipating planning for the liquidity needs in
each branch of their region. District managers regularly meet regional man-
agers to discuss previous and current lenders’ figures, outstanding amounts,
recovery rates, number of clients, problems faced and measures taken after
submitting the monthly report. Social performance in terms of poverty re-
duction, economic empowerment or well-being of clients is rarely, if ever,
discussed. There are no incentives or mechanisms within ASA for field of-
ficers to measure, report or represent the interest of clients. The issue that
comes closest to social performance that is sometimes discussed is ‘conflict’
between clients and branch level staff, and these conflicts are only considered
significant when they threaten the financial performance of branches.
Regional managers reported experiencing pressures from district man-
agers to improve the performance figures of the branches under their super-
vision. One regional manager explained that district managers (respectfully
referred to as ‘the sirs’) visit branches to ‘motivate’ the staff and write a
review which ‘depends on the profit. In 2008, the sir gave a good review
but in 2009 and 2010 the profit was less and sir sent a circular to motivate
us to improve ourselves, but this year it is better’.7 Time use and profits are
central to branch performance. One branch manager explained to me8 that
when 23 clients out of 100 cannot repay, they manage to keep their financial
6. The MRA was established by the government of Bangladesh in 2006 to monitor and
supervise microfinance operations of NGO-MFIs.
7. Interview, ASA regional manager, Tangail District, April 2011.
8. Interview, ASA branch manager, Tangail District, April 2011.
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performance indicators high and generate profits if they disburse more and
bigger loans rapidly: ‘If the speed at which we can disburse loans is fast then
we can make profits, but if it’s slow then losses are faced. Initially our total
loan amount outstanding was low but now it’s about BDT 1.5 crore’.9
Branch managers explained how they keep human resource management
costs to a minimum within their branches. It is the branch staff members
themselves who handle recruitment and the training of loan officers. Train-
ing at ASA is mainly informal and occurs on the job through a process called
‘one-teaches-one-learning’. There is no formal training course or centralized
training centre. District and regional managers provide information to new
recruits for one or two days before they are sent to the field for a week to
observe how senior colleagues at branch level interact with clients, report
in passbooks and carry out other financial management procedures. The fol-
lowing week, new recruits apply what they have learnt under the supervision
of that same colleague. This decentralization achieves several purposes. It
enables the MFIs to avoid the costs and time associated with formal staff
training and ensures a continuum in institutional practices. It also means
branches are directly responsible for their new recruits’ performance.
Branches’ organization is standardized through a book developed by ASA,
known simply as the Manual. The Manual explains institutional policy, the
rules and protocols regarding staff promotion, recruitment, transfer, branch
default, staff misconduct and the remuneration scale. To ensure and safe-
guard financial integrity, ASA applies a policy of regular staff transfer. Loan
officers who work for many years in the same villages become familiar
with clients and local elites and could establish informal relationships and
‘deals’ with them. Top managers interviewed reported that there was a risk
of loan officers’ financial performance declining as a result of informal and
personal relations limiting their capacity to enforce repayment. By rotating
loan officers between branches every three years, ASA aims to reduce fraud
and maintain financial discipline.
One has to recognize ASA’s commendable capacity for financial man-
agement and monitoring. With approximately 14,000 loan officers handling
cash daily, the scope for misappropriating money is considerable. The Man-
ual facilitates managers’ decision making, reduces their discretionary power
on human resource issues and financial management and decreases oppor-
tunities for fraud, money misappropriation and mismanagement. Branch
managers verify daily transactions that loan officers record by entering data
into ASA’s computerized system, which also enables higher-level managers
to monitor liquidity. ASA’s monitoring system is so efficient that it report-
edly detects fraud and default within 1 to 15 days. Beyond tight monitoring,
administrative sanctions and penalty systems safeguard ASA’s financial
performance. Mistakes and faults have negative repercussions for multiple
9. That is BDT 15 million or approximately US$ 210,000 at 2011 exchange rate.
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employees throughout the hierarchy. Branch managers, regional managers
and district managers oversee the loan register and are personally fined when
mistakes are found. Financial sanctions vary according to their position and
proportionally according to their salary and size of the error but can represent
up to 10 per cent of monthly salary. Moreover, bad financial performance,
mistakes and transgressions are noted in the staff members’ personal files
and are likely to have negative effects on promotion prospects.
In contrast to most organizations in Bangladesh, ASA’s human resource
management system, especially recruitment procedures, salaries and inter-
nal promotion, is perceived as meritocratic and performance-based, rather
than nepotistic or clientelistic. This finding is in line with the arguments
of Ahmad (2002b) and Uphoff (1996) that the culture and management of
large-scale NGOs in Bangladesh has professionalized around strict rules
and policies on promotion or transfer. Branch managers and regional man-
agers reported starting their careers within ASA as loan officers and getting
steadily promoted. ASA’s Executive Vice President explained: ‘In ASA we
have only one entry position which is loan officer. . . . We don’t directly
recruit branch manager or upper-level staff. Gradually we promote them to
senior positions’.10 Interviews with staff members suggest that decent wages
and transparent promotional paths were a prominent part of their reason for
joining ASA. They reported being satisfied with the salary structure in place
and motivated by the career prospects within the NGO.11
As mentioned above, in order to avoid potential conflict of interests at
the frontline of microfinance delivery, ASA applies a strict transfer policy
according to which credit officers switch branch every three years. This
mechanism aims to ensure high repayment rates, reduce fraud and maintain
financial performance. In theory, frequent and automatic transfers and puni-
tive transfers in cases of low financial performance provide strong incentives
for credit officers to maintain a professional distance from their clients.
In practice, staff performance is assessed through an evaluation of fi-
nancial performance combined with managers’ recommendations and test
results. Staff members compete among themselves to be rated highly ac-
cording to their transactions records and financial achievements. It is not
surprising therefore that in the staff survey, 47.6 per cent of credit officers
at ASA reported being motivated by bonuses and rewards such as ‘thank
you’ letters.12 When I asked what data were used to evaluate employees, one
branch manager at ASA explained:
From the beginning of each month, each employee’s number of new loan clients, the loan
collection and their outstanding amount is calculated each and every day on the computer. At
the end of the month we can get an idea about their performance and take steps accordingly.
10. Interview, ASA Executive Vice President, June 2011.
11. Self-completed questionnaires, ASA credit officers, closed and open-ended questions,
Tangail District branch.
12. Self-completed questionnaires, ASA credit officers, Tangail District branch.
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You must note that our [the branch’s] earnings and success depends on these loan officers’
performance levels and evaluation.13
EVERYDAY RULING RELATIONS: TEXT AND TARGETS
Decentralization, tight financial monitoring and low-cost human resource
management are efficient devices that secure financial performance and
growth for ASA. Within ASA the configuration of these ruling relations
is a great source of stress and strain for the frontline staff involved in
implementing microfinance and enforcing financial performance.
Financial performance is a priority of the management and organizational
culture at every level of ASA. The head office communicates non-negotiable
financial targets to branch managers who are responsible for anticipating the
demand for loans (loan uptake). Each loan officer is assigned individual
financial targets, with a determined number of clients to recruit and retain
and a set loan amount to lend out to clients. Monthly disbursement targets
are set twice a year in six-month reports.
It is important to note that the majority of loan officers sleep in ASA
branch dormitories. This is particularly common for men, while women
generally have the choice to live at the branch or outside with their family.
All the five branches studied displayed, in the main common room where
loan officers eat and rest, organizational rules and posters exhibiting yearly
financial figures and, on blackboards, daily and weekly cash flow targets and
achievements. The blackboards highlighted three daily targets, including
the number of borrowers visited, the daily disbursement amount and the
daily repayment to be collected. The everyday routine of loan officers is
to write the amount to be collected that day on the board in front of their
colleagues, then depart for the villages by 8 am to collect kisti (repayment)
before returning to the branch by 2 pm, filling out daily financial transaction
reports together and writing the amount they have collected on the board
beside the target amount.
This institutional practice is not temporary or specific to the locality, but
constructs translocal institutional practices. As argued by Smith (2001), it is
the textuality of ruling relations that fix those ruling relations, regardless of
variabilities of place, time and people. In large-scale organizations such as
ASA, the ‘text’ — here the Manual, the posters and the blackboard — orga-
nizes the way in which employees are socially connected. By its presence, it
transcends the social reality to create formal, standardized and acontextual
relations ruling individual performance. Its public display, highlighting the
gap between targets and achievement, is a powerful tool to reinforce financial
discipline. This is especially effective as individual financial performance
13. Interview, ASA branch manager, Tangail District branch, April 2011.
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determines overall staff performance and promotions. Achieving these set
targets relies on the loan officers’ ability to recover all their loans.
What if targets are not achieved? Underachievement is punished through
financial penalties, pressures and sanctions put on branch managers and
loan officers. Regular and abrupt staff transfers and direct financial fines
are designed to enforce timely repayment collection. When loan officers are
unable to collect instalments, they are warned about the consequences ‘bad
repayments’ have for the institution and strongly rebuked by their managers
(sometimes in public). The following written accounts from loan officers
illustrate these deeply stressful institutional patterns:
The worst part is that in every position the subordinates suffer mental harassment from
superiors.14
The rules in ASA and the mental harassment faced by the employees are the worst part of
ASA.15
If their repayment performance does not improve, employees get a written
warning and must pay a fine. Moreover, their yearly salary increment can
be cancelled and their holidays go unpaid. Staff survey results and written
statements reveal credit officers’ stress and anxieties within the institution.
Half the credit officers surveyed reported that managers get angry very often
in the organization and 76 per cent reported being motivated by the fear of
punishment and exclusion. The fear of being socially excluded or in conflict
with colleagues is reportedly strong, especially given that most credit officers
live together at the branches.
PERFORMING IN THE FIELD
Building on findings presented above, I argue here that ruling relations
embedded within the institution shape the subjectivity, agency and everyday
practices of frontline staff in a way that achieves financial performance
but undermines social performance. Daily client recruitment, top-up loans,
follow-up procedures and repayment collection practices tacitly drift at the
field level.
In top-down MFIs where management is decentralized, fieldworkers sub-
jected to high financial-performance pressures are often marginalized within
the organizational structure of their large-scale institution (Agier and Sza-
farzy, 2010). In ASA, the structure of the field administration and the high
levels of decentralization mean that credit officers are often isolated when
they are in the field, without close supervision from branch managers. As
such, they have considerable discretionary power that they are incentivized
to use to achieve their financial targets. This shapes practices and attitudes
14. Self-completed questionnaire, ASA credit officer, Tangail District Branch, March 2011.
15. Self-completed questionnaire, ASA credit officer, Tangail District Branch, March 2011.
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towards clients in ways that contradict microfinance’s stated social mission,
theory of practice, and the formal policies of ASA itself.
In line with MacDonald’s (2012: 102) findings, clients and non-clients
interviewed described ASA as an MFI that lends money ‘easily’. Lower-
ing standards for selection and follow-up of clients allows loan officers to
meet their short-term financial targets. Poor client selection refers to the
targeting of households that are likely not to have the capacity to invest in
income-generating activities and who are likely to use the loan for immediate
consumption. The geographic location of such clients allows loan officers
to reduce the time dedicated to kisti collection. Spending time with clients
to explain the purpose and implications of loans is not incentivized within
the institution. Some 66 per cent of loan officers reported that their clients
‘do not understand the concept of credit’, and often this was identified as a
consequence of time constraints faced by credit officers. During five focus
group discussions, clients explained that misreporting the intended purpose
of the loan on application forms with the full knowledge of credit officers
was common. Clients would state that loans were for ‘business purposes’
(bebsha kora, in Bengali), when in fact they were intended for a range of
other uses, thereby enabling clients to access loans, and credit officers to
lend money and recruit new borrowers.
One of the oldest tenets of microfinance is the feasibility of collateral-
free loans to the poor (Morduch, 1999). The data suggest, however, that
outside the conventional joint-liability setting, credit officers, to securitize
credit transactions, exploit their discretionary power and make informal
judgements of loan applicants’ ability to access sources of repayment. Ma-
terial and immaterial forms of what I call ‘micro-collaterals’ compensate
for thorough, time-consuming screening and follow-up procedures. Assets
(pots, pans, chickens, roofing material), MFI clientship and social connec-
tions (wealth of family and friends) are three prominent sources of liquidity
that influence credit officers’ decisions. This practice, also documented by
Fernando (2006), Uddin (2013) and White and Alam (2013), enables credit
officers to compel clients to maintain timely kisti repayments and mitigate
their risk of underperforming.
Households with long-standing relationships with MFIs (former and cur-
rent clients) described credit officers as commercial agents aiming to per-
suade any household to borrow increasingly large amounts from their MFI
regardless of the intended (or actual) use of the loan or capacity to repay.
They repeatedly said ‘MFIs give and take money, nothing else’ (‘taka dai
khali, taka nei . . . ar kicchu nai’) to explain the interaction between clients
and credit officers. According to clients, these sorts of practices are increas-
ing. A former client of ASA and BRAC for 15 years explains why she quit
microfinance:
Banks [MFIs] give money to everyone, they don’t worry about helping anymore; they only
care about interest and repayments. . . . People misuse the money now and the officers do
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not check on them like they used to. The relationship was better then. . . . They only talk
about money and instalments; before they were very light hearted. They would advise us
about our mistakes but now it’s nothing like this.16
Many poor clients reported that credit officers pressured them to take up
loans. This practice relates to both the recruitment of new clients and en-
couraging existing clients to take new and larger loans. This finding directly
challenges the common perception that there is an unquestionable demand
and need for formal credit, that top-up loans serve to make financial products
more flexible for clients (Laureti and Hamp, 2011) and that large loan size
indicates high social-performance achievement. Credit officers are reported
to go door to door to ‘persuade’ households to borrow, and use forceful
methods to make household members feel ignorant and imprudent if they do
not borrow, or borrow larger amounts. Such a practice constitutes a form of
hard selling (tsap dawa).
During an in-depth interview, Zoshim, who was a client of ASA for many
years, claimed that once clients manage to repay their loan, credit officers
force them to borrow larger amounts17 regardless of their needs, income or
ability to repay: ‘Then at times they try to exert force. They knock down the
doors and slam doors, such kind of pressure . . . they coerce us into taking
loans. They say that if we do not take loans then they shall take inappropriate
action and even violence’.18 Some women clients reported that men were
encouraged by loan officers to use their wives to access loans. Eight informal
discussions and one focus group discussion with women clients indicated
that women were sometimes violently reprimanded or threatened by their
husbands when they refused to borrow from MFIs. On several occasions
women reported that it was the credit officers themselves who suggested
such violence.
There are a number of tactics loan officers use to achieve timely repayment
from client households.19 An analysis of these points to some of the everyday
ambiguities and constraints branch-level employees face in attempting to
achieve high repayments rates. In their accounts both loan officers and
clients consistently reported that MFIs, in general, do not tolerate delays in
kisti repayment.
Micro-collaterals, both material and immaterial, are used as leverage by
credit officers in case of non-repayment. It is common that a client’s hus-
band, brother-in-law, father or friend is asked by credit officers to intervene
and lend money to the client so the debt can be paid off. When needed, in-
fluential external parties are also often informally pulled in to these financial
dealings by the MFIs. In the case study area, the head of the police, a Union
16. Interview, Parveen, former microfinance client, Tangail District, February 2011.
17. Having repaid one loan, clients are usually eligible for larger loan amounts.
18. Interview, Zoshim, former microfinance client, Tangail District, December 2010.
19. While there is no space to go into these tactics in depth here, a detailed analysis can be
found in Maıˆtrot (2014).
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Parishad member,20 the village head and Upazila chairman explained that
MFIs commonly use them as a means to pressure defaulting clients: they
might visit the MFI clients’ houses, issue notices for the MFI, mediate be-
tween loan officers and clients, and pressure clients’ families and neighbours
to repay kisti for them.
The practice of ‘unauthorized, though tacitly accepted, asset confiscations’
identified by Cons and Paprocki (2010: 645) in another district of Bangladesh
was reported by two of the six focus groups in the study area. Clients
described valuable assets (such as chickens, ducks, chairs, pots and pans or
tin roofing sheets) being seized by MFIs operating in the area and sold at the
market to get sufficient cash to cover the kisti due on that day. Mobilizing
material forms of micro-collateral enables credit officers to meet their daily
targets. Clients and credit officers reported across multiple interviews in
different study sites that even in the event of the death of a client’s close
relative (a husband, a son or a daughter), credit officers sat in clients’ houses
until they repaid their kisti. In some cases, this left the client without enough
money to bury the body and pay for a funeral ceremony.
Another means to collect kisti from defaulting clients is to use their MFI
savings as loan collateral to conceal clients’ default. This practice was re-
ported by the clients and later confirmed by branch managers as a system
called ‘savings withdrawal’.21 This common practice often generates con-
flicts between loan officers and borrowers, who described being reluctant
to save if their savings are used as loan collateral. These informal prac-
tices, when they become systematic, can often contradict the purpose of
voluntary or mandatory savings (providing clients with a security buffer
against shocks). To avoid such drastic measures, which would attract the
attention of their manager, credit officers often try to mitigate problems of
non-repayment amongst themselves. A quarter of ASA loan officers inter-
viewed reported having repaid the money due for repayment themselves, or
relying on colleagues who have sufficient liquidity on that day to maintain a
steady repayment record. Loan officers would then report to their manager
that the kisti had been successfully collected, later recovering the money
informally.
In a dense and deeply competitive MFI market, collecting kisti can be-
come a source of conflict between credit officers and clients. An ASA credit
officer wrote: ‘the organization is not ready to accept [a] delay in instal-
ment. So we have to be inhuman and treat the clients in an inhuman way’
to convince them to pay.22 More than 70 per cent of credit officers surveyed
reported that collecting repayments from clients was difficult and responses
collected from clients, former clients, non-clients and MFI staff members
depict relationships as hostile. Clients reported dreading the day when the
20. Each Union Parishad is composed of one elected chairman and nine elected members.
21. Interview, ASA branch manager, Tangail District, April 2011.
22. Self-completed questionnaire, credit officers, ASA Tangail branches, April 2011.
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kisti is due because if they ‘fail’ to repay on that day credit officers ‘change
their colours’.23 This colloquial Bengali expression has strong negative con-
notations, referring to MFI employees’ rapid mind-set change, to attitudes
described as ‘abusive’, ‘threatening’ and ‘publicly humiliating’.24 All six
focus group discussions conducted with clients reported having experienced
or observed such practices.25 During informal discussions, loan officers
reported that managers encouraged and trained them (through ‘one-teaches-
one’) to collect kisti punctually. Survey results report that 47 per cent of
credit officers admit having threatened clients to force them to repay and 12
out of 21 credit officer reports gave accounts of ASA’s hard-line approach to
client repayment.26 Credit officers and managers exploit their discretionary
power to enforce financial discipline and timely repayment. Some managers
interviewed reported using religion to discipline clients, invoking verses of
the Quran. A regional manager described telling a client: ‘God will make
you pay for this someday. . . . Because of this you will be cursed for life.
Maybe I will not come to you again, but another Manager who will be in my
position later will come for you once again. This will go on throughout your
life. You will pay for this’.27As a result of credit officers’ attitudes, some
women clients said they feared being alone on repayment day. A woman
interviewed reported that her credit officer made explicit sexual threats in
public such as ‘We will stay in the house today, make a bed for me!’ aimed at
humiliating her.28 Another woman reported that her credit officer instructed
her to go hang herself if she could not repay.29 It was commonly reported
that credit officers would make clients feel guilty about their medical, school
and food expenses and advise them to reduce their medication, children’s
education and diet (Maıˆtrot, 2014).
An informal branch-level rule bans credit officers from returning to their
office — which is also their home — without the expected amount. As a
result, all tiers of staff, including branch, district and regional managers,
reported returning to clients’ homes at night or on Fridays (which is a holy
day) when clients failed to repay. Molida, a former client who borrowed
from Grameen, BRAC and ASA for three years, five years and one year
respectively, reported that she stopping borrowing from all MFIs 10 years
ago as she and her husband experienced regular disrespect and day and night
harassment from credit officers.30 Credit officers also report suffering from
this rule:
23. Interview, current microfinance client, January 2011.
24. Informal discussions, current and former clients, March 2011.
25. Focus group discussions, improving, stabilizing and declining clients, four villages in
Tangail District, February 2011.
26. Self-completed questionnaire, ASA Tangail branches, April 2011.
27. Interview, regional manager, Tangail District, May 2011.
28. Interview, Molida, former microfinance client, Tangail District, February 2011.
29. Focus group discussion, stable and declining clients, February 2011.
30. Interview, Molida, former microfinance client, Tangail District, February 2011.
24 Mathilde Maıˆtrot
When I do not get an instalment then I inform my boss that ‘sir, there is a problem in this
house and they cannot repay today’. Then my boss orders me to sit in that house until my
clients give the money. ‘If you have to sit there throughout the night you will but do not
come back without the instalment’ he says. So if I leave without the money and I face this
kind of mental and physical torture I feel like quitting the job.31
The results from the survey conducted with ASA’s credit officers show
that although official office time ends between 5 pm and 6 pm, 76 per cent
of them ‘regularly’ return to the office after 8 pm and 51 per cent ‘regularly’
return after 10 pm. Written statements from loan officers indicate that this
practice often involves collective action from different members of staff:
If I do not get an instalment I inform the manager. Then he comes with all the staff and we
stay in the client’s house up to 12 or 1 o’clock at night. And we are not authorized to enter
the office without the instalment. Whatever happens I have to collect the instalment and then
can go to the office.32
This practice can also involve regional managers, one of whom reports:
‘Yesterday [Friday] I went to seven such people who do not cooperate prop-
erly with us. We went in three groups, four people per group and one Team
Leader in each group. We had target of going to at least 15 clients. . . .
There are about 200 defaulters in total in this branch’.33 Working during
the night and on weekends to collect repayments is compulsory to avoid
disciplinary measures such as personal financial sanctions and the loss of
promotion prospects. It is also necessary to circumvent the negative col-
lective implications that non-repayment could have for their branch, which
would threaten their relationships with their manager and colleagues. Credit
officers are strongly incentivized to solve problems by themselves, and do
‘what works’, since involving members of staff higher up in the hierarchy re-
flects negatively on their capabilities and often generates resentment among
colleagues.
Despite this, clients often expressed empathy toward MFI credit officers.
They sometimes justified credit officers’ attitudes, claiming that they could
not be blamed for these practices and that such outcomes clearly stem from
institutional pressures. They stated that officers are ‘simply following orders
of the top officials’, that they are ‘scolded at work by their managers’ who
reportedly say ‘terrible words to them in public’.34 Some clients reported
stories of temporary default that led to extreme situations for loan officers.
Once a pregnant female credit officer came at night to collect the overdue
repayment, begging the client to find a way to repay, saying she dreaded
her manager’s reaction if she returned to the MFI office empty-handed. The
client was incapable of finding the money that evening and the client and
officer spent the night under the same roof until the officer’s waters broke.
31. Self-completed questionnaire, ASA credit officer, Tangail Branch, March 2011.
32. Self-completed questionnaire, ASA Credit Officer, Tangail Branch, March 2011.
33. Interview, ASA regional manager, Tangail District, June 2011.
34. Focus group discussion, stable and declining clients, Tangail District, February 2011.
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The client had no means to take her to the nearest hospital and had to mobilize
other ASA clients.
CONCLUSION
This article advances the concept of ‘practice drift’ to denote the develop-
ment of everyday practices at the field level that undermine microfinance
institutions’ social performance. Joining the dots between findings emerg-
ing from institution-focused studies (MacDonald, 2012; Shekh, 2006; Siwale
and Ritchie, 2011) and impact studies (Aoki and Pradhan, 2013; Attanasio
et al., 2015; Dattasharma et al., 2016; Thibbotuwawa et al., 2012; Waelde,
2011) it sheds light on the unfolding of institutional practice in the specific
cultural and organizational context of a non-profit NGO in rural Bangladesh
called ASA. In so doing, it suggests an alternative way of understanding the
diverse outcomes of microfinance and its varying impact on poverty reduc-
tion. The approach developed acknowledges and problematizes processes of
implementation and the roles of implementers for institutional performance
and microfinance’s impact.
The analysis of implementation processes and of the power of imple-
menters strongly challenges deterministic policy frameworks and demon-
strates how frontline staff engage with everyday brokering activities to en-
force financial performance. The study deconstructs common assumptions
made about social performance and demonstrates that it is not naturally or
systematically achieved through the provision of financial products and ser-
vices to the poor. This suggests that depth and width of outreach are therefore
insufficient and misleading proxies for social performance.
The use of ethnographic data collected at the village and institutional level
permitted an in-depth analysis of the multiple everyday roles, ruling rela-
tions and experiences of clients, former clients and field-level staff members
in microfinance activities. This approach enabled the study of relationships
between systemic informal practices and institutional performance. Apply-
ing the work of Lipsky (1980), Jepperson (1991) and de Certeau et al.
(1980), the article revealed some of the everyday tactics and routines that
allow the street-level bureaucrats of microfinance institutions to use their
discretionary power to serve their interests by achieving financial targets in
a timely manner. The evidence presented in the last two sections demon-
strates how informal practices such as forceful recruitment procedures, hard
selling of larger loans, abusive and sometimes violent repayment collection
practices are developed and replicated by field-level staff. These, I argue,
are systemic and constitute a practice drift that contradicts the social mission
of microfinance.
There are strong reasons to think that these everyday practices of neg-
ligence, violence and abuse through which policies are redefined are not
‘micro’ and specific to the context in which the study was conducted, but
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‘macro’. In other words, they are characteristic of the enabling organ-
izational structures and management systems of commercial, standard-
ized and low-cost models of microfinance implementation with insufficient
social-performance monitoring and framework. The external validity of the
practice-drift phenomenon is therefore likely to go beyond the specific con-
text of the villages and institution examined here, and have bearing on
contexts where similar low-cost models are operating and where analogous
institutional practices have been reported (van den Berg et al., 2015; Taka-
hashi et al., 2010). If microfinance is to achieve its social mission there is
a need, as illustrated in this article, for new approaches and efforts to un-
derstand how commercialization shapes the practice of microfinance in the
lives of its clients.
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